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It is safe to posit that human beings have been interested in their own inner mental experiences
from the moment they became aware of them, arguably over 60,000 years ago (Leary, 2004). In
sharp contrast, growth in the actual scientific examination of these inner experiences is remarkably
recent (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi and Figurski, 1982; Klinger and Cox, 1987–1988; Goldstein and
Kenen, 1988; Hurlburt, 1990). Inner speech, in particular, has been the focus of even more recent
efforts (e.g., Morin et al., 2011; Brinthaupt and Dove, 2012; Hurlburt et al., 2013; Alderson-Day and
Fernyhough, 2015; Alderson-Day et al., 2015). We present 14 articles that cover theoretical ideas
as well as current research results pertaining to themeasurement, frequency, content, and functions
of inner experiences. In what follows we summarize some exciting key findings highlighted in
this research topic.
CONTENT AND FUNCTIONS OF INNER EXPERIENCES/INNER
SPEECH
There are large individual differences in inner experiences (i.e., inner speech, inner seeing,
unsymbolized thinking, feelings, sensory awareness). In particular, resting states (relaxing without
falling asleep with eyes open) seem to differ substantially from one participant to the next (Hurlburt
et al., 2015). The resting state includes several distinct dimensions such as thinking about others’
mental states, planning, sleepiness, bodily awareness, inner speech, mental imagery, and health
concerns (Diaz et al., 2014). Inner speech probably represents a speaking activity that does not
have a proper function in cognition. Rather, it inherits the array of functions of outer speech
(Martínez-Manrique and Vicente, 2015). Furthermore, the relation between inner and outer speech
is more complex than initially thought—e.g., patients with inner speech deficits can still overtly
name objects (Langland-Hassan et al., 2015).
MEASUREMENT OF INNER EXPERIENCES
Many existing self-consciousness scales measure various related—yet different—self-reflective
constructs such as adaptive-maladaptive, public-private self-consciousness, and mindfulness
(DaSilveira et al., 2015). Smartphone technology allows us to significantly refine current thought
sampling methods (e.g., ecological momentary assessment)—e.g., by gathering repeated sampling
within various situations of daily life in very large samples, and allowing the capture of dispositional
expressions (Runyan and Steinke, 2015). Repeated sampling can also promote self-awareness and
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mindfulness. Also, inner speech measured with self-report
questionnaires and thought sampling procedures poorly
correlate, suggesting that self-report approaches may not be
valid (Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015; also see Uttl
et al., 2011). One exception is the Self-Talk Scale, which
exhibits good psychometric qualities in multiple studies
(Brinthaupt et al., 2015).
MEMORY, TIME PERCEPTION, AESTHETIC
EXPERIENCE, AND IMAGINATION
When compared to younger participants, older adults report
more details (e.g., when and where of events, emotions
experienced, people and objects involved) in their remote/recent
autobiographical memories (Gardner et al., 2015). Delayed
video presentations of one’s own body image alters time
perception (Fritz et al., 2015). Aesthetic insight (i.e., the
“aha” phenomenon) occurs as artistic material becomes more
complex and determinate, increases liking, and is preceded
by increased interest, supporting the theory that interest
is increased by the expectation of understanding (Muth
et al., 2015). Imagination and creative thought likely emerge
from the conceptual and factual knowledge accumulated
throughout our lives—our semantic learning (Abraham and
Bubic, 2015).
Based on the 14 articles presented here, we suggest that
future work on inner experiences expand on (a) future-
oriented thinking, (b) naturally occurring mentalizing, (c)
mindfulness, (d) abnormal manifestations of inner experiences,
(e) correlations between inner experiences and actual behavior,
(f) inner experience changes with age, (g) inner experiences in
altered states of mind and religious states, as well as (h) in infants
and non-human animals.
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